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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON

Release of Reservists  
Involuntarily Recalled  
To Active Duty

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Release of Reservists Involuntarily Recalled to Active Duty

I have carefully reviewed the problem of releasing the reservists involuntarily recalled to active duty last fall. It is the judgment of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretaries of the Military Departments and myself that these personnel can be released late this summer without significantly affecting our over-all military posture.

As you are aware, these reservists were recalled with the clear understanding, as expressed in the authorizing Joint Resolution of the Congress, that they would be released from active duty in not more than twelve months. The purpose of the call-up, as well as the other measures proposed last summer, was explained to the Congressional Committees in the following words:

"What we are seeking to achieve, and achieve quickly, is a peak readiness of our military establishment to respond promptly with appropriate forces, and in adequate strength, to any kind of armed Communist aggression anywhere in the world; and to maintain that posture until we can see more clearly what lies ahead. Because we cannot foresee with certainty how events may develop over the coming months, we cannot say at this time whether the strength increases we now propose will necessarily be permanent."

Early this year, in presenting your 1963 Defense program and budget to the same Congressional Committees, we pointed out that:

"Although we have taken certain special measures directly related to the Berlin crisis, the defense program we are recommending for the coming fiscal year is geared to our global requirements over the long term."

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"We are convinced that the rapid build-up in our conventional forces made possible by the call-up of the reserves has done much to stabilize the Berlin situation . . . /but/ It is not a practical policy to rely on the reserve forces to meet the repeated crises which inevitably lie ahead. We must maintain an adequate level of active forces to meet these crises, relying on the reserve forces for augmentation only when armed conflict

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is imminent. Those reserve units which are subject to call for limited war crises must be brought to a much higher level of combat readiness and given first call on all of the resources available to the reserve components."

The release of the reservists late this summer is consistent with the above policies. Although most of these reservists could be kept on active duty through September, it is deemed advisable to release them beginning in August in order to give them some time to make the necessary personal adjustments before the beginning of the next school year.

This early release will not cause any important dislocations in our plan. The three Army divisions which had been engaged in training activities last year are now fully combat ready. The two new regular Army divisions should reach combat ready status by late summer. The two National Guard divisions will return to reserve status with a high level of combat readiness, as will a large number of other Army Reserve and National Guard units. Similarly, the Navy Reserve units (40 destroyer-type ships and 18 ASW air squadrons) will have an immediate (twenty-four hours) remobilization capability at full operational effectiveness for at least a year after they have been returned to reserve status. In the case of the Air Force, a large portion of the aircraft recalled to active duty with the reserve units will be retained in the active forces after the personnel return to reserve status.

Since all Army Reserve component units to be released are in the United States, the Army's combat strength in Europe will not be affected by this action. We believe that no reduction should be made in Army combat units in Europe as long as the current crisis persists. However, it may be possible, through a careful screening of support forces, to effect some reduction of Army personnel strength in Europe without reducing combat power. Any adjustments of this type will be carefully timed to offset any adverse effects. In this connection, it should be noted that we have prepositioned in Europe two divisions worth of equipment and we have carefully tested our capability to airlift additional troops to Europe within a very short period of time.

In the case of the Air Force, 10 Air National Guard tactical fighter squadrons are now stationed in Europe, together with 22 fighter squadrons of the regular Air Force. Under the present program for fiscal year 1963, the force level for Europe is 21 such squadrons. We now believe that this reduction is too sharp and, in any event, should be made more gradually. Accordingly, we propose to deploy 3 additional regular Air Force fighter squadrons to Europe and to activate 4 F84-F squadrons in Europe, using the aircraft and equipment of the ANG squadrons already there. The four F84-F squadrons will form one of the five new fighter wings provided for in the FY 1963 budget. We also propose to increase the operational readiness of 5 dispersed operating bases in Europe, prestocked and manned for immediate operational use. Further, we shall plan to deploy 4 F-100D squadrons from the Strike Command to Europe to cover the

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transitional reorganization period (July-fall 1962). The requirement for this deployment can be finally determined in June 1962. In any event, this force should remain in Europe no longer than is urgently required.

Even after these adjustments have been completed, our over-all military strength will be significantly improved over that of June 30, 1961, as the following table indicates.

	<u>30 June 1961</u>	<u>Reservists to be Released</u>	<u>30 Sep 62 After Release of Reserves</u>
Army Strength	857,900	110,000	960,000
Navy Strength	627,100	8,000	664,400
Air Force Strength	820,500	27,000	866,300
Marine Corps Strength	176,900		190,000
Army Strength USAREUR	232,000		274,000*
Army Combat Ready Divisions	11		16
Total Active Fleet	819		863
Attack Nuclear Submarines	14		18
POLARIS Submarines	5		9
Amphibious Ships	110		130
AF Fighter Squadrons	55		69
AF Strategic Missile Squadrons	5		17
AF Fighter Squadrons in Europe	22		32

Moreover, we have in the last year significantly increased the rate of production and deliveries of modern weapons, ammunition, and equipment, and raised the readiness level of the forces.

Army

a. Accelerated procurement and delivery by end FY 63 of:

- (1) New M-14 rifles, M-60 machine guns, 90 mm M-67 recoilless rifles, and grenade launchers to meet full active Army requirements.
- (2) New self-propelled 105 and 155 mm howitzers and M-60 tanks (105 mm gun) to meet USAREUR requirements.
- (3) New lightweight M-113 armored personnel carriers to equip USAREUR, USARPAC, and one STRAC division.

b. Prepositioned in Europe equipment for two divisions and ten support units.

\* Subject to possible reduction through careful screening of support forces.

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Navy

- a. Augmented the Fleet with new ships (the carriers ENTERPRISE, CONSTELLATION, and KITTY HAWK; the nuclear-powered cruiser LONG BEACH; the amphibious assault ship OKINAWA). Also, 52 rehabilitated ships will have been returned to the active fleet during the period 30 June 1961 to 30 September 1962. 32 of these ships are destroyers all of which possess an increased antisubmarine warfare (ASW) capability.
- b. Accelerated aircraft procurement and delivery will have provided modernization of 19 aircraft squadrons by 30 September 1962.

Air Force

- a. The portion of the SAC bomber force on 15-minute ground alert has been increased from 33% to 50% (including a small number of bombers continuously airborne in the airborne alert training program).
- b. 6 new F-105 tactical fighter squadrons will be operational in Europe and 4 in the United States by 1 June 1962. Each F-105D squadron can deliver approximately twice as much ordnance as an F-100 squadron in an air-to-ground role.
- c. Accelerated procurement and delivery of non-nuclear ordnance of increased effectiveness has appreciably increased tactical combat power.

As a result of the above accomplishments, I believe that we are now in a position to release the Reservists in August 1962. We should, however, do this in a manner which minimizes any adverse political, psychological, or military impact which otherwise might result. The rationale presented should demonstrate that our increased military posture now permits the release of the Reservists.

I therefore recommend that you:

- a. Approve the release in August 1962 of involuntarily recalled Reservists, specifically:

Army -- 110,000 personnel; 400 combat, technical and administrative units.

Navy -- 8,000 personnel partially manning 13 destroyers, 27 destroyer escorts; and fully manning 18 land-based aircraft squadrons.

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Air Force -- 27,000 personnel manning 11 troop carrier squadrons, 21 tactical fighter and 4 reconnaissance squadrons, 8 weather flights, and 1 tactical control group.

- b. Announce your decision promptly. (A draft of a possible statement to the press is attached.)

Secretary Rusk concurs.

*Robert S. McNamara*

Inclosure  
Draft Statement

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